Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, concerns over the security of energy and communication infrastructure in the Baltic Sea intensified. Initially, focus was placed on the threat of hybrid attacks from Russia.
However, it became evident that Russian military vessels and so-called “research” ships were actively mapping the seabed infrastructure of NATO countries and conducting military exercises near critical NATO infrastructure in international waters. Why target such facilities? Prolonged disruptions to internet connectivity could disrupt businesses, especially financial markets, provoke public anxiety about security, and set the stage for broader military conflict with the Baltic states.
In October 2023, the Chinese-registered vessel NewNew Polar Bear dragged its anchor, causing significant damage to two undersea telecommunications cables and a gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea. This marked the first such incident.
The European Union and NATO responded more forcefully, launching an investigation into the event. Although the NewNew Polar Bear returned to Tianjin, China, efforts to enhance the protection of seabed infrastructure and monitor security were initiated. This incident, coupled with the explosions of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines in September 2022, raised concerns about the growing vulnerability of undersea infrastructure.
In February 2023, NATO established the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell in Brussels. During the NATO summit in Vilnius in July 2023, the alliance’s Maritime Command in Northwood, United Kingdom, established the Maritime Center for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure. However, these measures were still in their infancy and could not guarantee the prevention of future incidents.
After the NewNew Polar Bear incident, no maritime patrols were introduced to quickly address abnormal activities by civilian vessels linked to Russia or sudden changes in vessel routes. Intelligence-sharing was enhanced, and in February 2024, the European Commission issued its first Recommendation on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures. This recommendation, which emphasized faster information exchange and stress tests of undersea infrastructure, sought to consolidate fragmented actions and address the needs of individual countries.
By late 2024, another incident occurred when the Chinese cargo ship Yi Peng 3 dragged its anchor, severing two undersea fiber-optic cables connecting Germany to Finland and Lithuania to Sweden. During a meeting of Nordic and Baltic leaders, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk proposed a joint maritime policing program among Baltic Sea nations to safeguard their undersea infrastructure from external security threats.
Meanwhile, Finland detained the Russian-linked tanker Eagle S, which had been part of a shadow Russian fleet transporting sanctioned oil. The tanker had dragged its anchor over 100 kilometers, damaging the Estonia-Finland Estlink 2 and four telecommunications cables.
In response, NATO countries in the Baltic Sea have established an international fleet tasked with countering unusual vessel activities near energy and communication infrastructure. While these forces are not equipped to control the entire seabed of the Baltic Sea, their presence signals to Russia and China that sabotage attempts will provoke a response, and perpetrators will not easily escape the sites of sabotage.
It is clear who stands to benefit from these acts of sabotage, with Moscow being the main suspect. However, the question remains: who is directly responsible? Is it the shipping companies employing untrained crews for the shadow Russian tanker fleet violating sanctions, or is it Russian intelligence services seeking to enable sabotage and create favorable conditions for it?
“It is clear who stands to benefit from these acts of sabotage, with Moscow being the main suspect.”
Furthermore, with the return of U.S. President Donald Trump to office, questions may arise about Europe’s ongoing collaboration with Chinese companies in laying undersea telecommunications cables, which could jeopardize data security. For example, the Chinese company Huawei Marine Networks (HMN) Tech operates a cable connecting Singapore to Marseille, France, which went live in December 2022.
The strategic cooperation between China and Russia, aimed at undermining NATO and EU countries, is well known. Therefore, principles to mitigate the threats posed by these countries must be consistently upheld and not ignored.
Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed in the op-ed section are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Kyiv Independent.
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