China’s Belt and Road Initiative Is Reshaping Global Power Infrastructure

Since 2013, when China launched its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), interest in the measure has been sharply divided. Proponents in Beijing and across the Global South view the BRI as a transformational platform for economic cooperation that delivers much-needed infrastructure, energy security, and industrial modernization to developing nations. Parts of the West view it more skeptically, framing it as a geopolitical tool or an expansive strategy designed to extend China’s economic and political influence through debt-laden projects and strategic energy investments.

What is clear is that the BRI has made rapid gains in helping developing economies bulk up on energy infrastructure. In January, Wood Mackenzie noted that Chinese companies have installed 156 GW of power projects in participating countries since the BRI’s launch (Figure 1). “Between 2013 to 2024, these companies completed 369 overseas power projects, representing an investment of approximately US$281 billion,” said Yanqi Cao, managing consultant, Asia Pacific power research at Wood Mackenzie.

The bulk of these projects—70%—have been based in Asia, followed by Africa at 15%, Wood Mackenzie reported. “The top five [BIR] markets—Pakistan, Indonesia, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, and Malaysia—are expected to see substantial growth in wind and solar installations over the next decade, with a projected 120 GW requiring an investment of US$73 billion,” it said. “Among these nations, Saudi Arabia is projected to have the highest demand, with plans to install 41 GW of solar power and 13 GW of wind power.”

According to Boston University’s China’s Global Power Database, if Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) and investment from China’s two policy banks—the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China—are considered, the number of power projects China has supported outside its borders ramps up dramatically. “As of mid-2022, Chinese capital has supported 648 power plants overseas, representing 1,423 individual power generating units providing a total of 171.6 GW of power generation capacity,” it says. “Among these power plants, Chinese capital participation includes FDI in the form of greenfield investments or mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and debt finance,” it explains.

What Has Driven the Rapid Expansion?

To delve deeper into why the BRI has flourished so rapidly over its decade-long existence, it helps to understand what the BRI is and how it has evolved into a major global power play. As Beijing-based think tank Xinhua Institute explains, when President Xi Jinping announced the measure, it was framed as a modern-day revival of the ancient Silk Road—an extensive network of trade routes that historically connected China to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Its core mission was to promote global trade, infrastructure expansion, and economic cooperation, particularly in developing nations that lacked the financial capacity to modernize their economies.

Initially, the BRI primarily focused on transportation and logistics for enhanced connectivity, including financing large-scale projects such as ports, highways, and railways. In recent years, its scope has expanded to include energy development, digital infrastructure, and industrial growth. At the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in 2023, President Xi Jinping introduced the “Eight Major Steps,” a policy framework that seeks to enhance BRI investments by expanding clean energy and low-carbon development. Essentially, it prioritizes “small and beautiful” projects with greater social benefits.

A key pillar is the “Green Silk Road,” which reflects Beijing’s concerted focus on solar, wind, hydro, and grid modernization. Chinese firms, backed by state-owned banks, have quickly gained traction in global clean energy supply chains, and today, China is the largest supplier of solar panels, wind turbines, and lithium-ion batteries. The policy framework, meanwhile, strengthens the “Digital Silk Road,” which is focused on expanding China’s global influence in digital infrastructure through artificial intelligence (AI), smart grids, 5G networks, cloud computing, and data-driven energy solutions.

2. The 3,444-MW Ilha Solteira Hydropower Station, one of Brazil’s largest hydroelectric plants, is located on the Paraná River at the junction of São Paulo and Mato Grosso do Sul. The plant, modernized by Sinohydro Bureau 11 Co., a subsidiary of POWERCHINA, underwent a major technological upgrade, with Unit No. 20 completing water commissioning and beginning operation in December 2020. It features 20 Francis turbines. Courtesy: POWERCHINA

Among the many major power infrastructure projects completed under the BRI in recent years are the 3,444-MW Ilha Solteira Hydropower Plant in Brazil (Figure 2), a project that is majority-owned by China Three Gorges Corp., and the 2,290-MW Karachi Coastal Nuclear Plant in Pakistan, which was financed by China Exim Bank. In Indonesia, Shenhua Group developed the 2,100-MW PLTU Jawa 7 coal plant, while Harbin Electric built the 2,400-MW Hassyan gas plant in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In Sweden, China General Nuclear Power Group holds a 75% stake in the 644-MW Markbygden Wind Farm, one of the nation’s largest wind farms.

Under the more recent “Green Silk Road” initiative, the 950-MW Maktoum Solar Park Phase IV in Dubai became fully operational in February 2024, spearheaded by a China-UAE collaboration. Chinese firms last year also put online Côte d’Ivoire’s 112.9-MW Gribo-Popoli Hydropower Station and the 600-MW Karuma Hydropower Station in Uganda.

“Chinese companies are more and more involved in investing in renewable power in the top five [BRI] markets,” said Cao. “Five years ago, they accounted for only 7% of the wind and solar capacity in these markets. However, this share has risen to over 60% in 2024, and it could reach 80% by 2030, if the current trend continues.”

Geopolitical Contention

As the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) explains, the BRI is a state-backed financing model, which relies heavily on loans and direct investments from Chinese financial institutions such as the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank). The banks provide long-term, low-interest loans to BRI partner countries to allow them to fund large-scale infrastructure projects that could otherwise be financially unfeasible. However, unlike traditional foreign aid models, BRI projects are often executed through engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) contracts—an approach that ensures Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) maintain direct control over key aspects of project development, from construction to operation. It means that, often, even when a project is in a partner country, Chinese companies own, manage, and profit from its operations.

That aspect has drawn controversy. Supporters argue that the BRI fills critical infrastructure gaps in developing economies, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America, where Western financing has historically been insufficient or slow-moving. China, notably, points out that its efforts to provide immediate capital for power plants and other infrastructure has helped unlock economic growth opportunities for developing countries. That holds true in Africa. While 80% of the 685 million people without electricity live in sub-Saharan Africa, China has emerged as a key infrastructure partner, investing in solar power, microgrids, and school and healthcare facilities’ electrification. Challenges persist: As the World Research Institute points out, electricity consumption still remains critically low due to high costs, limited industrial development, and financial constraints.

Critics—among them the U.S. government—warn of financial risks associated with BRI loans, cautioning “debt-trap diplomacy” could overburden countries with Chinese debt and ultimately force them to cede strategic assets as collateral. The GAO points out that 31 of the 36 nations most at risk of debt distress are BRI participants. However, beyond debt concerns, some Western analysts are concerned that the BRI is furnishing China with long-term economic, political, and geopolitical influence. As a major energy and digital infrastructure provider, China is positioned to shape the rules of global economic engagement—albeit in ways that could undermine (or leave out) Western interests, the GAO writes.

The concern rests on the country’s growing influence over energy supply chains, project financing, and equipment and services. Some projects also open new opportunities for Chinese firms to embed digital solutions, such as AI-driven energy management solutions, into energy infrastructure, raising new questions about China’s influence and control of energy data.

For now, China appears to have assumed the role of the primary architect of energy systems across the developing world, and it has moved concertedly to provide assurance that it plans to work collaboratively to deliver progress. The BRI is “not a modernization that China seeks to achieve in isolation, but rather one that aims for joint modernization with other developing countries and the world at large,” writes Xinhua Institute. The unilateral endeavor is a shared responsibility where all parties benefit equally, it argues.

“Without shared growth and prosperity, true global peace and stability cannot be achieved, and the results of global modernization will be difficult to sustain,” it says. “In the face of widening global gaps between the Global North and South, increasing challenges for developing countries to catch up, and worsening income inequality within nations, the BRI offers a realistic path to modernization for developing nations. The BRI reflects China’s deep understanding and unique perspective on modernization, encompassing not only material improvements but also comprehensive social progress.”

—Sonal Patel is a POWER senior editor (@sonalcpatel, @POWERmagazine).