Friday, November 22, 2024

Making the case: Evidence generation infrastructure in the 2024 election

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2024 U.S. ELECTIONS RAPID RESEARCH BLOG

This is part of an ongoing series of rapid research blog posts and rapid research analysis about the 2024 U.S. elections from the University of Washington’s Center for an Informed Public. It was crossposted on the CIP’s election rumor research Substack newsletter.

By Stephen Prochaska, Danielle Lee Tomson, and Kate Starbird
Center for an Informed Public
University of Washington

Key Takeaways

  • Self-described election integrity organizations have developed new tools and repurposed existing infrastructure, including phone apps, to encourage the capture and digital sharing of “evidence” of perceived election fraud.
  • This infrastructure is strategically deployed to gather alleged “evidence” of voter fraud and use that evidence — often in misleading ways — to motivate and mobilize political and legal action.
  • This process of motivating, gathering, and using alleged evidence of election fraud appears to be part of a political strategy facilitated by what we call “evidence generation infrastructure.” 
  • Depending upon the outcomes and margins of certain high-profile races, we anticipate that this evidence generated by this infrastructure could be used to attempt to make the case — rhetorically, politically, and legally — that the 2024 election is full of fraud and, potentially, illegitimate.

Overview

One defining feature of the 2024 election is the maturation of an infrastructure that supports the generation of “evidence” — often in the form videos, images, or data that fuel false or misleading rumors about election fraud — that feeds political and legal action that can be used to contest election results. We have seen this dynamic in action previously, during the 2020 presidential election and 2022 midterms. However, the machinery is increasingly well-oiled.

Self-described election integrity organizations, many of which are sympathetic to presidential candidate Donald Trump, have developed new tools and repurposed existing infrastructure to encourage the capture and digital sharing of “evidence” of perceived election fraud. Often, this evidence is misinterpreted or intentionally mischaracterized to fit a dominant narrative that has been seeded and repeated throughout this election cycle (and prior ones), alleging that the election will be fraudulent. In 2020, this “rigged election” narrative set an expectation and later a false perception that mail-in ballots — among other objects — would be a vector for voter fraud and that Democrats would “steal” the election. This cycle, the narrative backdrop centers on the allegation that this election will be rife with illegal voting from non-citizens. 

Much like 2020, we have seen an organized effort to lay the groundwork to “prove” election fraud integrating three interconnected components: 1) persuasion of conservative audiences that voter fraud will happen en masse, 2) solicitation of volunteer poll watchers and others to share “evidence” of fraud via social media as well as dedicated digital apps and hotlines, and 3) use of that evidence to motivate lawsuits, protests, and other efforts to contest undesirable results. Though organic in places, this process of motivating, gathering, and mobilizing “evidence” of election fraud appears to be part of a political strategy. Depending upon the outcomes and margins of certain high-profile races, we anticipate that this evidence could be used to attempt to make the case — rhetorically, politically, and legally — that the 2024 election is full of fraud and, potentially, illegitimate. This evidence generation infrastructure could also be deployed in more targeted ways to argue that certain races should not be certified and that counting procedures — for example, around provisional ballots — should be changed in specific places.

While we saw these informational and organizational dynamics at play in 2020 as a result of evidence generation infrastructure, in 2024 our analysis suggests that the infrastructure is much more mature and robust. There appears to be more organized efforts to recruit volunteers for election integrity efforts and more apps to collect evidence. We anticipate more election litigation, motivated and scaffolded by the crowdsourced “evidence” of fraud. There is already an unprecedented amount of pre-election civil suits, with the GOP boasting over 130 cases.  

In this post, we describe a strategic but loosely organized political infrastructure — consisting of political organizing, partisan media, social media, technological platforms, and a growing legal apparatus — and explain how this infrastructure is strategically employed to gather so-called “evidence” of voter fraud and use that evidence to motivate and mobilize political and legal action.

The Political Strategy of Evidence Motivation, Generation, and Use

In 2020 and 2022, we saw a dynamic whereby political actors used alternative and social media to persuade the public that election fraud was taking place. They built infrastructure to recruit poll watchers — primed by political messaging to suspect mass voter fraud — to report election irregularities using hotlines and social media. As “evidence” was shared online, it sparked rumors that spread rapidly as the public engaged in “collective sensemaking” to try to understand what was going on. Often, these rumors had a persuasive or motivational effect on the public, and the generated “evidence” — in photo or video format — was then used to support legal action. Lawsuits, affidavits, and other actions would then spur further rumoring. This process is facilitated by what we call “evidence generation infrastructure.” 

Figure 1: A diagram of the iterative process facilitated by evidence generation infrastructure.

Rumors may be sparked or fueled by a piece of “evidence” (e.g., a photo, hearsay, video, data, eyewitness experience or account) that is (mis)interpreted and packaged within a particular frame. Sometimes, the “evidence” shared in rumors is insufficient to support the claim. Still, the overall narrative and the conversation around the claim may persist, taking on a life of its own or supporting a larger, broader “deep story” that is hard to fact-check.

This dynamic — of evidence motivation, gathering, and use — can be strategically appropriated by interested actors. For instance, political organizations may try to mobilize their communities to create and collect “evidence” of a phenomenon and share it online, such that the material can be framed, explained, and amplified by other actors to support a larger, pre-existing narrative. Even when individual rumors fade or are debunked, the narrative lives on — persuading audiences to believe something or to take action. In some instances, the evidence, rumor, and narrative may inspire collective action like protests — some of which may be grassroots, others which are astroturfed — or legal action by interested parties. 

The rest of this post lays out how we have seen this dynamic at play this election cycle, particularly with the meta-narrative of non-citizen voting motivating the public to gather perceived evidence of voter fraud that has and will continue to be used for lawsuits and other political action. This process is not neatly linear but rather cyclical (Figure 1).

Motivating Participation: Persuading the Public

One step in this apparent political strategy is to persuade the public that mass voter fraud is occurring and then motivate them to participate in stopping it. For instance, early in this election cycle, we saw videos produced by political influencers and political organizations that suggested mass numbers of non-citizens were planning to vote in the 2024 elections. 

In a March 2024 research report, we discussed a boosted video of an influencer who conducted “man on the street” interviews with migrants at the southern U.S. border, claiming that the migrants were planning on illegally voting for then-candidate Joe Biden. The video spread rapidly on X. Earlier this summer, the Heritage Foundation’s Oversight Project released viral undercover videos of filmmakers asking Latinos in an apartment complex in Georgia if they were U.S. citizens and who they were planning to vote for in the coming election. The filmmakers deceptively told interviewees they worked for a company helping Latinos navigate the election. The Heritage Foundation used the videos as “evidence” that there was mass non-citizen voting — alleging 47,000 non-citizens were registered. Elon Musk retweeted the videos. The Heritage Foundation later acknowledged that none of the individuals interviewed in the videos were registered to vote. Lead Stories subsequently spoke with several of the interviewees, revealing that some were confused or unaware that they were being interviewed.   One said she had lied, fearing that they might try to register her to vote. These cases were part of a broader series of deceptive videos by the Heritage Foundation’s Oversight Project. 

Videos like these support a larger meta-narrative central to the Trump campaign’s messaging that migrants are coming illegally via the Southern border, causing damage to the U.S. economy, culture, security, and democracy. They also inspire further rumors about non-citizen voting, which have continued against the broader backdrop of anti-immigrant rhetoric, including the recent false allegations that Haitian immigrants in Springfield, Ohio, were eating pets

These meta-narratives may be invoked in strategically developed storytelling that can compel people to take political action. As such, concerted efforts are made to produce compelling media products that harken to and elevate these narratives, such as documentaries, books, and viral video campaigns. These film-screenings, book groups, or online conversations about a viral video may also engender a sense of community. This was exemplified in 2022 when a self-described election integrity organization, True the Vote, helped produce the now-debunked film 2000 Mules, which presented false and misleading “evidence” to support claims that drop boxes are major vectors of fraud — but inspired many to volunteer despite its inaccuracies. Promotional press at the time lauded the film as “the most successful political documentary in a decade.” Republican groups around the country screened it — including a debut at Mar-a-Lago — in advance of the midterms. True the Vote collaborated with Clean Elections USA to prevent alleged “ballot trafficking” by recruiting volunteers to monitor these drop boxes in many locations who would take photos or film people dropping off ballots. Some volunteers showed up armed and in tactical gear, sparking rumors of voter intimidation (rumors distinct from the political strategy), leading to lawsuits and potentially discouraging voters from using drop boxes due to accusations of intimidation. 

Gathering Evidence: Soliciting Participation, Posting Online, Offering Apps

Persuaded by the deep story that mass election fraud is occurring, some people may feel compelled to volunteer to monitor elections to document or stop such fraud. Often, they will use digital infrastructure developed by these organizations to report irregularities or post the perceived irregularities directly online, only for the content to be amplified by influencers, audiences, or even foreign adversaries, further reinforcing the perception that the election is illegitimate.

Poll watcher and worker recruitment

Historically speaking, poll watchers have been a staple of U.S. elections. They are not official election workers and may be partisan or part of advocacy organizations. However, they are still allowed access to observe election administration in ways voters are not. They are not allowed to interfere in election processes, and their role is primarily to report issues to party officials and those in charge of polling locations. Since the 2020 election cycle, a belief has persisted among many Republicans that the presidential election was stolen, making “election integrity” a highly partisan issue. Continuing a practice that we saw in 2020 (see Image 1), many right-wing election integrity organizations, influencers, candidates, and the Republican National Committee itself actively recruit volunteer poll watchers and ballot drop box watchers by leading them to landing pages on websites via social media posts (see Image 2). This cycle, we have seen organizations that promoted election denialism in 2020 recruiting and training people to be not just poll watchers but apply to be poll workers administering elections. 

Image 1: Example of a tweet former President Trump sent to recruit poll watchers. At least 12 tweets with identical text and links to defendyourballot.com or armyfortrump.com were sent between September and October 2020.

Image 1: Example of a tweet former President Trump sent to recruit poll watchers. At least 12 tweets with identical text and links to defendyourballot.com or armyfortrump.com were sent between September and October 2020.

 

 

Figure 2: Promotional posts of the GOP Election Integrity Team’s “Protect the Vote Tour” and associated website where volunteers can sign up to be poll watchers.

Image 2: Promotional posts of the GOP Election Integrity Team’s “Protect the Vote Tour” and associated website where volunteers can sign up to be poll watchers. 

Recent years have highlighted some risks potentially posed by partisan poll watchers who bring to their duties a posture that the 2020 election was stolen. We anticipate this year following this trend. Some of the volunteer trainings sponsored by partisan organizations reinforce this message. These factors contribute to volunteer poll watchers getting into confrontations, mistakenly identifying “fraud,” and the potential for voter intimidation. In addition to video or photographic “evidence” posted to social media that may mistakenly be interpreted as fraud, videotaped confrontations may themselves be vectors for rumors.

Providing apps and websites to post perceived irregularities

We’ve also seen many organizations advertise apps and websites for volunteers to report perceived irregularities via photo or video — many of which are then posted to social media. Some of these include veteran organizations such as True the Vote, which this cycle announced Vote Alert, an app allowing those who download it to “Ask questions, report suspicious activity, follow trending events, and join a boots-on-the-ground coalition dedicated to safeguarding our representative republic.” True the Vote also offers a Spanish-language page called “Voto Honesto” with a telephone hotline connected to Vote Alert for Spanish speakers to report irregularities. Before being able to use the app, users must agree to a disclaimer that distances True the Vote from the potential consequences of people not using the app “responsibly.” Presumably, this is included to prevent association with situations similar to the accusations of voter intimidation in 2022 (Image 3).

On the left, a tweet from True the Vote’s account on X promoting their Vote Alert app. On the right a screenshot of the disclaimer that potential volunteers must agree to prior to using the app.

Image 3: On the left, a tweet from True the Vote’s account on X promoting their Vote Alert app. On the right a screenshot of the disclaimer that potential volunteers must agree to prior to using the app.

Newer players include the “Election Integrity Community” page on X, part of Elon Musk’s “America PAC,”  where users can “Share potential incidents of voter fraud or irregularities you see while voting in the 2024 election” (Image 4).  MyPillow CEO Mike Lindell, who has reportedly been financing and promoting a variety of election denial efforts, also offers an app to collect information.

Image 4: A Screenshot of Elon Musk’s America PAC Election Integrity Community on X, offering a digital space to collect incidents of alleged voter fraud.

Image 4: A screenshot of Elon Musk’s America PAC Election Integrity Community on X, offering a digital space to collect incidents of alleged voter fraud.

In addition to these apps being used to support informal poll watching, participation in evidence generation may occur in other ways. For example, we recently published an analysis of rumors of alleged voter fraud coming from provisions for Americans overseas to vote (via the UOCAVA). The rumors were prompted by articles posted by a conservative media outlet. Many internet users who read about this rumor proceeded to try to register to vote in other states using a widget that helps to fill out the Federal Post Card Application. They posted screenshots of these efforts online as “proof” they had registered when, in fact, filling out the postcard does not guarantee registration. The article that initiated the rumors also referenced data from CheckMyVote.org, a website that collects state voter file data (including data from Freedom of Information Act and other public records requests) and other datasets. Its purpose is to put “voter-roll management in the hands of American citizens by providing helpful analysis and tools to engage with volunteers and elected clerks,” as stated on its website

The “evidence” of voter fraud in the alleged data, videos, or photos may compel political or legal action (if not potentially part of a larger propaganda campaign).

Mobilizing Evidence: Lawsuits and Collective Action

Depending upon the outcome of certain high-profile races and the willingness of the candidate(s) to challenge results, the collected evidence may — and in some scenarios is likely to — be used to motivate political action and power lawsuits that attempt to change how votes are counted or certified, and possibly to overturn results. 

In 2020, false rumors about a “rigged election” were mobilized into rallies and protests. For instance, during Arizona’s “SharpieGate” rumoring event in 2020, the virality of the rumor was parlayed into more loosely organized evidence collection and offline mobilization. Some organized groups attempted to disrupt vote counting (e.g., outside vote counting centers in Arizona and Michigan) and others tried to stop certification (as we saw on January 6, 2021).

Depending on how the results unfold, 2024 may promise similar mobilization that could be potentially more organized and concerted. Political operative and progenitor of the “Stop the Steal” refrain Roger Stone has talked about sending armed guards to patrol polling and vote counting locations. The Trump campaign has also been evident in its plans, starting as early as 2021, to hire large numbers of poll workers and attorneys so they have supporters well-positioned to find “evidence” and send it to attorneys to potentially contest the election.  

Additionally, we are seeing political organizations like True the Vote capitalize upon suspicion about the accuracy of voter rolls (that they helped to sow) to recruit volunteers to challenge others’ registration status. In addition to their “Vote Alert” app, True the Vote launched their app “IV3” (Figure 9) which creates a streamlined process for volunteers to submit “voter challenges” to local election offices.

Image 5: Screenshot of promotion on True the Vote’s IV3 website of the use case for IV3, saying they are “crowdsourcing voter rolls” by streamlining volunteers’ ability to submit voter challenges.

Image 5: A screenshot of promotion on True the Vote’s IV3 website of the use case for IV3, saying they are “crowdsourcing voter rolls” by streamlining volunteers’ ability to submit voter challenges.

This app alone has already led to hundreds of thousands of voter challenges this cycle, many of which were improper, erroneous, and/or based upon inaccurate data. These mass challenges have the cumulative effect of taking valuable resources away from election officials. They may result in more confusion on Election Day — for eligible voters who find themselves to have been removed — likely generating more rumors. 

But perhaps the bigger story of 2024 will involve an increasingly sophisticated legal apparatus for laundering misinterpreted and misrepresented “evidence” into lawsuits that attempt to contest results, disrupt vote counting, and impact state court decisions around election procedures. Some pro-Trump legal organizations had started pursuing a few election law strategies in the 2022 midterms. In 2024, there have already been an unprecedented number of pre-election civil suits. 

In the wake of the 2020 election, Republican lawyers worked quickly to develop cases that could be used to contest different aspects of the election. Before the results had been finalized and the election had been formally “called,” they could be seen on social media recruiting people who had shared rumors about perceived election issues to file affidavits and serve as witnesses in lawsuits. For example, during the “SharpieGate” incident, as misleading rumors about Sharpie pens being used to disenfranchise Arizona GOP voters spread on Twitter, attorneys used that same platform to try to recruit potential eyewitnesses.

Screenshot of an example of a tweet asking for people to call attorneys based on rumors surrounding SharpieGate, anonymized to protect the privacy of a low-follower account.

Image 6: A screenshot of an example of a tweet asking for people to call attorneys based on rumors surrounding SharpieGate, anonymized to protect the privacy of a low-follower account.

Those claims were quickly funneled into a lawsuit filed the day after the election, withdrawn three days later, and rejected by a judge when the lawyer attempted to refile. Republican lawyers filed more than 60+ cases like this one in 2020. Though almost all were dismissed, these lawsuits and affidavits helped to launder false rumors, unfounded conspiracy theories, and dubious eyewitness accounts into the public record, where they reinforced the false narrative of a “rigged election.”

In 2024, the Trump campaign has already signaled its intention to use legal avenues to contest results, especially in swing states. And the apparatus for funneling rumors and crowdsourced “evidence” into lawsuits is much more mature.

To some extent, this dynamic is already at work. For instance, in our own research, we have seen unsubstantiated rumors about voter fraud via overseas (UOCAVA) voters mobilized into lawsuits in multiple states. And last week, Florida announced a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), suing for citizenship data. The lawsuit, which alleges that Florida needs the data to clean its voter rolls and DHS has not cooperated, is both motivated by and functions to reinforce the false narrative of widespread non-citizen voting. It references “ample evidence of non-citizen voting” and cites a brief document from the Heritage Foundation, despite the foundation’s own research finding fewer than 100 cases of non-citizen voting between 2002 and 2023. The lawsuit appears to follow a legal strategy put forth in June by America First Legal (AFL), a conservative legal organization started by former Trump advisor Stephen Miller in early 2021. Since its founding, AFL has filed several election administration lawsuits in key states like Pennsylvania and Arizona

With a robust infrastructure for gathering evidence, along with news that the Trump campaign has shifted considerable resources into its legal funds and “election integrity” efforts if conditions are right (close margins of the perceived defeat of Trump in swing states), we can expect to see dozens, perhaps even hundreds, of similar lawsuits. 

Ongoing Impact of Evidence Generation Infrastructure

Election denial narratives that were sown by evidence generation infrastructure in 2020 have had a lasting impact on election administration, enfranchisement, and election trust. 

Former Trump lawyer Cleta Mitchell created the “Election Integrity Network” in 2021, which has played a role in ongoing voter challenges, including challenges that resulted in improper removal of voters. Mitchell and her network pushed strongly to delegitimize and pressure states to withdraw from the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC). ERIC is a key software that allows states to keep track of voter movement and maintain cleaner voter rolls by using data from several government sources, including state-level departments of motor vehicles and other licensing agencies, the U.S. Postal Service, and the Social Security Administration. ERIC has been positively recognized by both Democrats and Republicans for its ability to streamline election administration and maintain accurate voter rolls, and, perhaps more importantly, has been called “one of the best fraud fighting tools that we have” by Ohio’s Republican secretary of state, Frank LaRose. Yet ERIC was caught up in larger false conspiratorial narratives that alleged, among many other claims, that the system was helping Democrats. By 2023, several states had left ERIC, including Florida, despite the governor initially praising it. States that have left ERIC have struggled to maintain clean and accurate voter rolls. 

In our own polls conducted with KING 5 News and The Seattle Times, we’ve seen how trust in election administration has decreased, particularly among Republicans in Washington in recent years. This tracks against larger national polls that show an increasing partisan split around trust in election integrity. According to a Gallup poll, 74% of Republicans versus 21% of Democrats believe that people using illegal or fraudulent means to vote is a “major problem.” 

The loss of trust coupled with the changes in election administration since 2020 — many stemming from the activism of election denial groups using evidence production infrastructure in the last presidential vote — will be exacerbated this cycle by the increased sophistication and deployment of evidence generation infrastructure.


  • Stephen Prochaska is a graduate research assistant at the University of Washington’s Center for an Informed Public and doctoral candidate in the UW Information School.
  • Danielle Lee Tomson is the CIP’s research manager.
  • Kate Starbird is a CIP co-founder and professor in the UW Department of Human Centered Design & Engineering.

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